










































































1 This work has been fully supported by the University of Rijeka under the project number 
uniri-drustv-18-226.
2 Acronym list and meaning: PS – political socialization; PIS – participants' ideological 
self-identification; PIO – parents' ideological orientation; FIO – family ideological orientation; 
IO – ideological orientation; SES – socio-economic status.
DOeS The Apple FAll FAr 
FrOM The Tree? AgenTS OF 
SOcIAlIzATIOn OF STuDenTS' 
IDeOlOgIcAl OrIenTATIOnS1
Abstract The paper presents the results of a survey that assessed the impact of 
informal and formal agents of the political socialization (pS) process on a sample 
of students enrolled at the university of rijeka (n = 635). The correlation between 
the participants' ideological self-identification (pIS) and the assessed ideological 
orientation of their parents (pIO) was analyzed. Students believe that no agent of 
socialization has even moderately influenced the formation of their political views 
and assess the weakest influence of the formal pS agent – teachers in primary and 
secondary schools. The participants believe that parents have influenced their po-
litical attitudes more than other agents, but assess this influence on average as 
weak, regardless of whether they place their parents in the same or different posi-
tions on the ideological orientation (IO) scale. left- and right-oriented participants 
admit a somewhat stronger influence of their parents' informal pS than those who 
rank themselves in the center. Statistically significant correlations between pIS and 
the perceived pIO were obtained. A small share of participants does not perceive a 
similarity between their own and their parents' IO and there is a negligible share of 
those who place their parents in diametrically opposed positions on the scale. The 
participants who have a greater interest in politics and those from a more politically 
stimulating environment are more inclined to move away from the political center 
and their parents' IO. concordance between family IOs increases with the percep-
tion of better relationships with parents.2
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The existing research reveals that, both globally and in Croatia, citizens show little 
interest in politics, have very little trust in political institutions, and participate po-
orly in elections (Gross, 2016; Sekulić and Šporer, 2010; Ančić, Baketa and Kovačić, 
2019; Ježovita, 2019). This is especially observable in the decline of conventional 
political participation of young people (Dalton, 2008; Sloam, 2016; Gvozdanović, 
Ilišin, Adamović, Potočnik, Baketa, and Kovačić, 2019). Young people also express 
high levels of distrust in "formal government institutions and their potential corre-
ctors" (Ilišin, 2014: 250). Are the weak interest in politics, modest political participa-
tion, and distrust in political institutions indicators of the failure of political sociali-
zation (PS), i.e., the failed generational transmission of political attitudes or are they 
a matter of successful transmission, i.e., acceptance of political views characteristic 
of their parents' generation?
Scholars agree that PS is a lifelong process that occurs most intensively in child-
hood and adolescence, most often in a family environment (Gecas, 2000; Kudrnač, 
2015). Thus formed political attitudes, such as political orientation, political prefer-
ences, and interest in politics, are challenging to change in later life. Traditional PS 
approaches hold that the patterns formed are petrified, thereby underestimating or 
completely neglecting the actors' role in the process and the impact of changes in 
the social context. Recent PS approaches emphasize children's and youth's roles and 
understand PS as a two-way and even reciprocal process (Gordon and Taft, 2011).
For the analysis of the PS process, it is important to take into account the so-
cio-historical context in which the transmission of social and political values and 
orientations to new generations takes place. In this context, Šiber points out that, in 
a situation of sudden and significant changes in the social system and political struc-
tures, PS takes place in circumstances where the values and norms of the previous 
order tend to be replaced by new ones that will correspond to the socio-political and 
economic relations on which the new order is based. He believes that such a PS con-
text is characteristic of countries in transition in Central and Eastern Europe (Šiber, 
1998). Ilišin highlights that the experiences of most post-socialist countries have 
shown that democratic transition is a relatively long and difficult process in which 
the new political order faces difficulties that slow down and partly distort desirable 
democratic processes (Ilišin, 1998). Transitional changes in Croatian society were 
marked by divisions between the normative and the real, between the proclaimed 
new democratic values and serious authoritarian aberrations of political power 
(Maldini, 2005). This process was also marked by contradictions at the sociocultural 
level, which were manifested through the conflict and intertwining of individualistic 
and collectivist social values in the lifestyles of young people (Tomić-Koludrović 
and Petrić, 2007). Aware of these challenges and contradictions of the transition of 
Croatian society, in our research, we wished to explore the degree of concordance 
between the students' and their parents' political orientations, how family charac-
teristics affect students' interest in politics and their political orientations, and how 
students overestimate the impact of various socialization agents on their personal 
attitudes. 
Agents of political socialization
Wasburn and Adkins Covert, expanding upon Sears' division (Sears, 1990, accord-










































































PS: The persistence perspective, the lifetime openness perspective, the impressionable 
years perspective, the life cycle perspective, the genetic approach, and the life course 
model. In order to present the theoretical-conceptual framework of the empirical 
analysis of our obtained data, we will briefly sketch out the basic theses of the first 
two perspectives. The persistence perspective argues that childhood is key to the PS 
process and that the basic structure of an individual's political attitudes is formed 
by early adolescence. In primary socialization within the family and school and 
peer groups, basic political attitudes are learned, adopted, and formed, and are only 
modified later in life, thus successfully maintaining the status quo of the political 
system. Critics hold against this perspective its neglect of children's role in trans-
mitting attitudes (Ojeda and Hatemi, 2015) because children are not their parents' 
clones even though they most often have similar political attitudes. From the persi-
stence perspective, there should be a high degree of concordance in children's and 
their parents' IO, and children should see their parents as an important agent of 
their PS. The lifetime openness perspective holds that PS is a lifelong process that 
continues in post-adolescence, as people shape their political views in accordance 
with new life circumstances. Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017) highlight that the 
political attitudes of most people do not change significantly during their lives and 
warn that this is because they choose partners and an environment that shares po-
litical attitudes identical to those they had adopted in primary socialization. Despite 
that, this perspective recognizes the possibility that individuals exposed to changing 
work and living circumstances may abandon the adopted and shape new political 
attitudes. For example, studying as a new life stage could influence the participants' 
political attitudes, so their IO could be different from their parents' IO. The thesis 
offers an explanation of these differences on the liberalizing effect of education on 
the example of attitudes about ethnic distance (Hello, Scheepers, Vermulst and Ger-
ris, 2004). "Although parents affect their children's level of ethnic distance, their 
influence cannot compete with the importance of the educational effect" (Hello et 
al., 2004: 264).
Discussions on the importance of individual socialization agents in the trans-
mission of political attitudes problematize the impact of family upbringing and cli-
mate, peer groups, educational institutions, volunteer organizations, religious or-
ganizations/communities, and the media (Wasburn and Adkins Covert, 2017). The 
most accepted thesis in the literature relates to the family as the essential PS agent 
(Hyman, 1959; Jennings, Stoker, and Bowers, 2009; Rico and Jennings, 2016). The 
key argument supporting this thesis is the great similarity between the parents' and 
children's political attitudes (Rico and Jennings, 2016), i.e., the thesis that there are 
common family political attitudes (Kudrnač, 2015). It is believed that the level of 
parental interest in politics, the concordance between the parents' political views, 
and the quality of the parent-child relationships are crucial factors of successful 
transmission. Jennings and Niemi (1974) distinguish between direct and indirect 
PS forms. Direct PS occurs when parents intentionally teach their children, while 
indirect PS is manifested under the influence of the family climate on shaping chil-
dren's political worldview. Šiber emphasizes that, in general, indirect PS refers to the 
acquisition of characteristics that in and of themselves are not political but affect the 
development of one's political personality through the process of transfer, appren-
ticeship, and generalization, while direct PS refers to the transfer of highly political 
content and orientation through the process of imitations, anticipatory socializa-

























In the context of the family impact on PS, Jennings and Niemi (1974) feel that 
parents significantly impact the shaping of their children's attitudes and values due 
to the intra-familial emotional connection. Hess and Torney (Hess and Torney 1968, 
according to to Verba, Lehman Schlozman, and Burns, 2005) consider that PS in the 
family takes place in three ways. Intentional PS occurs through family conversations 
and parental instruction, by which parents seek to explicitly convey their political 
views to children (accumulation model). Part of this process is the parental control 
of the political environment through the choice of children's friends and the sele-
ction of media information that enters the family space in which children move. Of 
course, today, it is increasingly difficult to control the information to which children 
are exposed, and the former mechanisms of influence are no longer common to the 
whole family (e.g., family TV time) but are rather individualized (use of the Internet 
and communication via social networks) (Buckingham, 2009). Furthermore, trans-
mission occurs by conveying attitudes when children identify with their parents as 
role models and mimic their political behavior (Rico and Jennings, 2016). The third 
form (model of interpersonal transmission) of indirect and unintentional PS occurs 
through the influence of the family's socio-economic status (SES) because the sharing 
of a common social context affects political participation and political preferences 
(Verba et al., 2005). Children's political worldview is shaped through everyday life 
experience under the influence of the family's political atmosphere, for example, in 
adult discussions in which children only passively participate. The importance of 
family SES is advocated by Henn and Foard (2014), who find that class affiliation 
has a key influence on the political participation of young people in the UK. The 
authors find that children from middle-class families are more interested in politics 
than working-class children. Other authors place the cultural aspect of SES in the 
foreground instead of the class one. Verba et al. (2005) emphasize the importance 
of the parents' education as the most easily measurable determinant of the family 
SES, as research reveals that more educated parents show greater interest in politics, 
are more politically engaged, and discuss politics more often so that such a family 
climate is "politically more stimulating". Families with a higher level of cultural cap-
ital encourage children's motivation for higher educational achievement, which is 
also associated with greater political engagement. Hello et al. (2004) determined a 
similar effect of education, "the higher the parents' social positions were, the higher 
young adults' educational attainment, which in turn has a negative effect on young 
adults' ethnic distance … which means that parents affect their children's ethnic 
distance indirectly through their educational attainment" (Hello et al. 2004: 263).
Rico and Jennings (2016) believe that the family's influence in the PS process 
depends on the level of the parents' political engagement, as politicized sons and 
daughters are children of politicized parents. Dostie-Goulet (2009) also claims that 
the level of children's politics is influenced by the politics of a tempered family cli-
mate, a "politically stimulating home". Hess and Torney (according to Verba et al., 
2005) call this socialization through family experience, which is generalized later in 
life. Another factor that significantly contributes to a successful generational trans-
mission is parental political homogamy, as parents' and children's political attitudes 
and behaviors are more similar when both parents have the same political views 
(Boehnke, Hadjar, and Baier, 2007; Hooghe and Boonen, 2015).
Parents with matching political views send children consistent, non-contradic-
tory information, while in the case of parents' different political views, these mes-










































































are the quality of family interactions, the affective relationship between parents and 
children, and the type of family communication. Parental support increases the 
sense of belonging to the family community and acceptance of their political pref-
erences. Ojeda and Hatemi emphasize that social support encourages motivation 
but does not necessarily lead to the same identification because some children will 
accept, while others will oppose their parents' party identification. In this context, 
Ojeda and Hatemi emphasize the two-way nature of the PS process, "we show that 
children play a critical role in the transmission of party identification; how children 
perceive and respond to parental values affects their own values" (Ojeda and Ha-
temi, 2015: 1152). Boehnke, Hadjar, and Baier (2007) find that parental influence 
in PS is stronger if family political attitudes deviate from the "spirit of the time" 
(zeitgeist). Thus, the concordance of the parents and their child's political attitudes 
will be greater if they differ from the dominant attitudes in society. Some authors 
advocate the model of direct transition according to which political attitudes adopted 
in childhood are quite permanent. "Children who acquire political predispositions 
early in life from their parents are more stable in their early adulthood than are 
those who ‘leave home without it'" (Jennings, et al., 2009:796). Based on this view, 
the political worldview has features that we find in religiosity, i.e., the patterns adop-
ted in childhood are difficult and extremely rare to change. Others (Koskimaa and 
Rapeli, 2015) believe that the family is key to the development of political identity. 
However, the political worldview is later modified in interactions in peer groups, 
with relatives, and neighbors. In support of this, Ojeda and Hatemi (2015) find that 
the concordance of the parents and children's political identification is much weaker 
than assumed. Hooghe and Boonen (2015) find that children are more like parents 
in the ideological orientation than in party preferences. Andersson (2015) elabo-
rates on the thesis of situational political socialization that considers changes in the 
modern world (new digital media, consumerism, cultural diversity, and individual-
ism), which lead to new forms of political engagement. The author claims that PS is 
particular and contextual and that it is essentially determined by the space in which 
it takes place. It is considered that, along with the family as the most important agent 
of the informal PS, the education system is the most important agent of the formal 
PS of children/youth in society.
Its function is the transmission of the dominant value and political worldview. 
The importance of school in PS theories is based on the assumption that the school 
curriculum and teachers' work contribute to the development of a politically con-
scious citizen who adopts democratic values. Niemi and Sobieszek (1977) argue that 
prolonged retention in the education system increases its importance in shaping 
young people's political attitudes. Campbell (2008) finds a positive impact of an open 
school climate and peer groups on adolescents' political behavior. Nevertheless, re-
search detects a weaker influence of the school on young people's political attitudes 
compared to other agents. Quintelier (2015) finds that school has less influence on 
the political participation of Belgian adolescents than peer groups and families. The 
author claims that parents have an important role in encouraging young people's 
political participation but that peer groups and volunteer associations that contrib-
ute to the development of skills needed for PS are even more important. Wasburn 
and Adkins Covert (2017) also debate the importance of the school system's impact 
on youth politics in the U.S. today. Koskimaa and Rapeli (2015) found that the po-
litical interest of young Finns is more strongly influenced by discussions and polit-

























believes that an analysis of the impact of formal political agents fails to detect the 
specifics of young people's new political engagement. "It is important to understand 
new forms of political socialization in different spaces and places in the democrat-
ic contingent media society" (Andersson, 2015: 981). Wasburn and Adkins Covert 
(2017) note that traditional PS agents (parents, teachers) use media content and, 
based on them, "construct the presentations of political reality which they deliver 
to their audiences" (Wasburn and Adkins Covert, 2017: 78). Traditional mass media 
(newspapers, television, and radio) influence the political nature of the audience by 
giving importance to certain topics and ways of their presentation.3
We can conclude that research finds different patterns of intergeneration-
al transmissions of political attitudes in different social contexts. Contrary to the 
current trend of growing international interest in research on political socialization 
from the sociological perspective (Kudrnač, 2015), in Croatia, it is extremely rare.4 
We can single out research that problematizes differences in attitudes about ethnic 
diversity and students' and their parents' social distance conducted on a national 
sample (Čačić-Kupmes, Gregurović and Kumpes, 2014) and an analysis of the re-
lationship between the students' political preferences and their parents' perceived 
political preferences on a sample of University of Zagreb students (Jović, Brezovec 
and Balabanić, 2021). The research whose results are presented in the continuation 
of this paper analyzes the importance of informal and formal PS agents from the stu-
dents' perspective. In analyzing the intergenerational transmission of IO, it should 
be taken into account that contradictory processes simultaneously mark the recent 
development of Croatian society: re-traditionalization that affirms collective values, 
including the traditional family hierarchy, and liberalization that affirms individual 
values, such as privacy and independence (Ilišin and Gvozdanović, 2016; Sekulić, 
2012). In addition, research involving the entire population uncovers low interest in 
politics (Ančić, et al., 2019) and low trust in political institutions (Sekulić and Špo-
rer, 2010), and the share of citizens who went to the polls in recent years is evidence 
of weak conventional political participation.5
Methodology
This research aims to analyze students' perceptions of the influence of particular so-
cialization agents on their political attitudes. The transmission of political attitudes 
is analyzed through the PIS relationship with their perception of PIO. The following 
questions are discussed:
1. How much importance do participants attach to particular agents in the pro-
cess of their PS?
2. To what extent do PIS coincide with and differ from PIO?
3 Wasburn and Adkins Covert (2017) also add religious organizations to the list of PS agents 
that can contribute to legitimizing the political system, offer a worldview that can encourage a 
propensity for a political option that is close to that worldview, and encourage social distance 
towards individual groups.
4 Although PS can be analyzed and explained from both the political science and psychological 
perspective, this paper approaches this phenomenon from a sociological perspective, however 
contextualy respecting the findings by political science.
5 For example, in the official Report of the State Electoral Commission, we find that 51.2% of 
voters in the first round and 55% in the second round voted in the election of the President of 










































































3. What is the correlation between the assessment of the family's impact as a PS 
agent and the concordance between PIS and PIO?
4. To what extent are family characteristics (parents' political homogamy, fami-
ly climate tempered by politics, and parent-child relationships) related to the 
concordance between PIS and PIO?
5. To what extent are familial socio-demographic characteristics connected with 
the PIS and PIO concordance and the assessment of the importance of PS 
agents?
Starting from the persistence perspective, this research tests the following hypotheses:
H1. The stimulating family political climate is related to the participants' inter-
est in politics. 
H2. The participants consider their parents to be a more important PS agent 
than all other agents.
H3. Participants' assessment of the importance of parents as PS agents is related 
to the characteristics of the family political climate.
H4. PIS and the perceived PIO largely coincide.
H5. The level of similarity between PIS and the perceived PIO is related to the 
characteristics of the family political climate.
Measuring instruments6
A five-point scale of the frequency of family discussions on political topics and the 
parents' political homogamy were taken as indicators of the family political climate.7 
A direct question measured the participants' interest in politics.
The participants assessed8 on a five-point scale the impact of each of the 
following socialization agents on their political attitudes: father, mother, other rela-
tives, best friend, peer group, the media, primary school teachers, and secondary school 
teachers. In an additional question, the participants were asked to assess which of the 
listed agents decisively influenced their political attitudes.9
As an indicator of the participants' political attitudes, a seven-degree scale of 
ideological orientation (three degrees on the left, one in the center, and three de-
grees on the right) was used, which in some analyses, due to statistical correctness,10 
was reduced to three categories (left, center, right).11 In addition to their own, the 
6 Variables from previous surveys of young people (Ilišin et al., 2013) and students (Ilišin, 2014) 
conducted by the Institute for Social Research in Zagreb (IDIZ) were also used in creating the 
questionnaire.
7 The categories of possible answers are shown in the text and tables, so we will not list them 
further due to spatial restrictions. 
8 Research on the transmission of political attitudes can be conducted using longitudinal 
research or a subsequent (retrospective) assessment of participants on the impact of individual 
agents on their attitudes. A retrospective method was used in this study.
9 For the purposes of statistical analysis, the crucial influence of mother and of father were 
merged into a single new variable: the influence of parents on PS.
10 The reason for merging the categories is the fact that, in some categories of responses, there is 
a relatively small number of participants and in the original scale with seven categories, too 
many cells with too few responses ("empty or skinny cells") emerged in the implementation of 
chi squares.

























participants were asked to assess the ideological orientation of their mother and 
father. For the purposes of the analysis, we created two new dichotomous variables: 
(1) concordance of the PIO – both parents have the same or different IO; (2) con-
cordance of family ideological orientation (FIO) – the participants and parents have 
the same or different IOs. Two new variables were created based on the position on 
the IO scale: (1) concordance of the PIO, with four categories: both are on the left, 
both are in the center, both are on the right, in different positions on the scale; (2) 
concordance of the FIO, also with four categories: the participant and both parents 
are located (1) on the left, (2) in the center, (3) on the right, (4) in a different position 
on the scale.
The following sociodemographic variables were also used: sex, settlement size, 
areas od peace and war, mother's and father's education level, subjective assessment 
of the family socioeconomic status (SES), and assessment within family relation-
ships, separately for both parents.
Data collection and sample description
The paper is based on the results of a survey conducted during classes on a con-
venience sample of students from eight components of the University of Rijeka in 
201512 (N = 635). The data were processed in the statistical package SPSS 24 at the 
univariant and bivariant analysis level (see Table 1).13
Results and discussion
Family political climate and interest in politics
Before analyzing the influence of PS agents on the transmission of political attitudes, 
we will present the results of the family climate characteristics and the participants' 
interest in politics. The family climate was measured with two "political" variables: 
the frequency of family discussions about politics and the concordance of both pa-
rents' IO and the previously presented assessment of the participants' overall relati-
onship with their parents.
Most participants' family climate is tempered by discussions about political con-
tent either occasionally (41.3%) or frequently (18.9%). Less than a tenth of the sample 
(7.4%) never discuss politics in the family, and less than a third of them (29.3%) do so 
questions about party preference and party affiliation. Despite the fact that three-quarters of 
the participants (73.2%) expressed their intention to go to the polls, only a quarter of them 
have a clear idea of which party they would vote for, and only every twentieth is a member of 
a political party.
12 Students from the following University constituents participated in the research: Faculty of 
Humanities and Social Studies, Faculty of Tourism and Hospitality Management, Faculty 
of Civil Engineering, Faculty of Law, Department of Physics, Department of Informatics, 
Faculty of Engineering, and Faculty of Teacher Education. We thank all the colleagues who 
helped conduct the survey.
13 Chi-square tests, t-tests, and analysis of the variance were performed. In ANOVA, a test of 
homogeneity of the variance, was performed, the F-ratio was tested, and posthoc multiple 
comparison tests were performed. The Scheffe test was used in the case of homogeneous 
variances, and the Tamhane T2 test in the case of inhomogeneous variances. Due to spatial 
restrictions, the statistical values of p in all analyses will be presented with the notation * for 










































































very rarely. It is reasonable to assume that family discussions on political topics are, in 
most cases, initiated by parents, because as many as half of the participants (51.8%) 
are mostly not interested or not interested at all in politics. A quarter of the sample is 
interested in politics, while a fifth (22.7%) is undecided.141516Only every twentieth par-
14 Percentages of students who did not answer the question are not shown, except in cases where 
the number of abstainers is indicative.
15 The variable of the participants' regional representation reveals a disproportion because more 
than half (61.6%) of participants come from two counties, Primorje-Gorski Kotar and Istria, 
a fifth (21.7%) are from counties in central and northwestern Croatia, a tenth (9.3%) from the 
southeastern (Dalmatian) counties, and a very small share (4.3%) of participants are from the 
northeastern (Slavonian) counties. In further statistical processing, a new variable was formed 
in which the participants were classified into two categories important for understanding the 
social context in which they were socialized. The first category included participants from 
counties afflicted by direct warfare in the 1990s (21.8%), and the second category included 
students from counties in which there was no direct warfare (75.2%).
16 Based on the education of both parents, a new independent variable Family cultural capital was 
constructed based on Wilekens' and Lievens' (2014) thesis on maximizing the family status. 
According to this thesis, there are common family cultural patterns determined by a parent 
who has a higher level of education. Since the participants whose parents have completed 
Table 1. Participants' sociodemographic characteristics (%)
Sex14 Areas of:15
Female 60.9 Peace 75.2
Male 38.4 War 21.8
Father's education Mother's education
Elementary school 2.9 Elementary school 5.4
Three-year high school 14.7 Three-year high school 8.7
Four-year high school 42.7 Four-year high school 47.9
College 17.8 College 14.0
University 20.6 University 22.9
Family cultural capital16 Assessment of SES17
Elementary school 0.9 Significantly worse than others 1.6
Three-year high school 6.9 Slightly worse than others 6.9
Four-year high school 38.0 Neither better nor worse than others 54.6
College 21.1 Slightly better than others 30.3
University 32.0 Significantly better than others 6.5
Assessment of the relationship with the 
mother18
Assessment of the relationship with  
the father
None 0.3 None 0.9
Extremely bad 0.5 Extremely bad 2.7
Mostly bad 0.8 Mostly bad 3.0
Sometimes good, sometimes bad 7.6 Sometimes good, sometimes bad 12.0
Mostly good 27.6 Mostly good 31.9
Extremely good 62.5 Extremely good 45.6
Not alive 0.5 Not alive 3.5
Settlement size Assessed relationship with both  parents19
Up to 1.000 20.8 Sometimes bad, sometimes good 21.5
1.001 – 10.000 37.3 Good 19.2
10.001 – 100.000 20.8 Extremely good 58.7

























ticipant shows great interest in politics, as opposed to five times as many (25.7%) of 
those who have no interest in politics.2017181920
As in previous studies (van Deth, Abendschon, and Vollmar 2011; McIntosh, Hart, 
and Younissi, 2007), and in line with the expectations arising from the first hypothesis, 
it was found that when the frequency of family discussions increased, the participants' 
interest in politics also increased (χ2 = 156.702**; df = 6; Cramer's V = .352). Politics is 
not of interest to the vast majority of participants who never (85.1%) or very rarely 
(76.3%) discuss political topics in the family. In contrast, politics is of interest to 
more than half (56.2%) of those who often discuss it in the family.
Participants were asked to evaluate their parents' IO, and the results are shown 
in Figure 1. Most participants believe that they "know" their parents' IO. The distri-
butions of the responses in both variables have a unimodal curve shape with a more 
pronounced left side.
The most numerous category in which the participants classify their mothers 
and fathers is the political center (37.1%, respectively). The remaining students 
ranked their parents as gravitating more towards the left (mothers 34%, fathers 
30.6%) than the right side of the scale (mothers 21.6%, fathers 23.7%). When the 
seven-point scale was reduced to three categories (left-center-right), more than 
 four-fifths (84.2%) of participants who answered these questions placed both pa-
rents on the same side of the scale (χ2 = 658.594**; df = 4; Cramer's V =.755). In 
other words, students perceive that there is a high level of ideological homogamy 
between their parents.
The distribution of results on the newly created variable Concordance of the 
parents' ideological orientation shows that the most numerous category in which 
the participants place both parents is the center (35.3%), followed by those who 
placed both parents on the left (29.9%) and those who placed both parents on the 
right (19.0%). In cases where the participants consider their IO to be different from 
their parents (15.6%), the vast majority placed one parent in the center. Only every 
only the primary school level are represented in a very small percentage, in further statistical 
analysis, they were added to the category Three-year high school for statistical correctness in 
all three educational variables.
17 For the sake of correctness, in further statistical processing, categories significantly and sli-
ghtly worse were merged into worse than others, and significantly and slightly better were mer-
ged into better than others.
18 In further statistical analysis, the answers none and not alive were excluded from the variables 
of mother-father relationship assessment.
19 Since the assumption of social learning theory that parental influence on PS is significant due 
to the emotional connection (Jennings and Niemi, 1974), we hypothesized that good interge-
nerational relationships would contribute to the successful transmission of political attitudes, 
reflected in greater recognition of parental influence and greater IO concordance. Based on 
the variables: relationship with the mother and relationship with the father, we created a new 
variable Assessed relationship with both parents, assuming that the family climate tempers the 
existence of a poor relationship with one parent. Due to the small proportion of those who 
assessed their relationship with their parents as poor, the new variable has only three moda-
lities: 1. sometimes bad, sometimes good – those who assessed their relationship with at least 
one parent in this way; 2. good – those who assessed their relationship with both parents as 
mostly good; 3. Extremely good – those who rated the relationship with both parents as such 
or assessed it as exceptional with one parent and generally good with the other.
20 The level of interest coincides with the results of a survey conducted on a national sample 











































































twentieth participant believes that they and their parents have opposite IOs, so they 
placed one parent on the left and the other on the right. Thus, most participants 
consider their PIOs to be identical, suggesting that they perceive the family political 
climate as harmonious and consistent. No statistical significance of the relationship 
of the variables of PIO concordance and the assessed quality of relationships with 
parents with the variable of the participants' interest in politics has been determined.
A politically stimulating home (Verba et al., 2005) is also determined by the 
elements of its SES, which means that external factors also determine the variations 
in the intentional family political socialization. ANOVA reveals that there is a statis-
tically significant difference between participants from families of different levels of 
cultural capital in the variables interest in politics (F(627) = 8.545**) and frequency of 
family political discussions (F(626) = 6.134*). Political interest is the lowest (M = 2.32), 
and politics is the least discussed (M = 2.66) in families where both parents have a 
high school education. Interest is slightly higher (M = 2.75), albeit still very weak, 
and discussions are more frequent (M = 2.95) in families where at least one parent 
has a university degree. The reason behind the link between the parents' level of 
educationand and their children's political interest, observed in previous research 
(Lauglo, 2011), can be explained by differences in access to political resources, i.e., 
the differences in the family social capital.
In addition, it was found that there is a statistically significant difference in the 
interest in politics between female and male students (t = 2.403*),21 thus confirming 
previous findings (Henn and Foard, 2014). Since these are participants with a simi-
lar level of education, the theory of gender socialization is more convincing than the 
theory of political resources in explaining this difference. Early gender socialization 
in childhood, dominant gender ideology, and practice in society suggest that politi-
cs is a "male job," thus silencing and dissuading women from the sphere of politics 
(Wasburn and Adkins Covert, 2017). However, it should be emphasized that interest 
in politics in both sexes is very weak.





The most numerous category in which the participants classify their mothers and fathers 
is the political center (37.1%, respectively). The remaining students ranked their parents as 
gravitating more towards the left (mothers 34%, fathers 30.6%) than the right side of the scale 
(mothers 21.6%, fathers 23.7%). When the seven-point scale was reduced to three categories 
(left-center-right), more than four-fifths (84.2%) of participants who answered these questions 
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both parents is the center (35.3%), followed by those who placed both parents on the left 
(29.9%) and h se who placed both parents on the right (19.0%). In cases where the participants 
consider their IO to be different from their parents (15.6%), the vast majority placed one parent 
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concordance and the assessed quality of relationships with parents with the variable of the 
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Political interest is the lowest (M = 2.32), and politics is the least discussed (M = 2.66) in 
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Assessing the impact of PS agents
Table 2 shows that all socialization agents received an average score of less than 2.50. 
In other words, the participants, on average, believe that no agent of socialization 
has even had a mediocre influence on shaping their political views.
In line with the second hypothesis, the participants consider both parents to 
be a more important agent of their PS than all others, but even this influence was 
assessed as weak on average. As many as a third of participants believe that neither 
the mother nor father have had any influence on their political views. In contrast, 
only one in six participants acknowledged the strong (a lot and extremely much22) 
influence of the father, and only one in eight participants of the mother.
In addition to the parents, the only agent that more than half of the participants 
admit has had such an influence on shaping their attitudes is the media (M = 2.12). 
The participants assessed the influence of their peers, other relatives, and friends as 
very weak, with more than half of them claiming these have had no influence at all 
and less than 6% to have significantly influenced their political views. The influence 
of primary school teachers is the weakest of all the agents offered, with less than 1% 
of participants acknowledging their strong influence and three-quarters claiming 
that there has been no influence at all. The participants, on average, acknowledged 
the slightly greater but still minimal influence of high school teachers with whom 
they were in contact at the most sensitive age of forming political attitudes.
The analysis reveals a significant correlation between the participants' assess-
ments of the influence of the mother and father on their political attitudes (Table 3). 
The vast majority of participants in all categories claimed that the influence of both 
parents on their political views was identical.23
Contrary to the expectations, no statistically significant difference was found in 
the assessment of the parents' influence on one's political views with regards to the 
22 Due to statistical correctness, in further processing, categories a lot and extremely much were 
merged into one category.
23 Shares range from two-thirds (a little) to four-fifths (not at all).
Table 2. To what extent have your political attitudes been influenced by (in %):
1 2 3 4 5 N.A. M S.D.
Your father 33.86 22.52 24.09 15.43 2.83 1.26 2.30 1.18
Your mother 36.54 25.98 23.15 11.02 2.36 0.94 2.16 1.11
The media 37.95 25.04 23.46 10.08 2.20 1.26 2.12 1.10
Your friends/peers 53.07 22.83 18.27 3.94 0.79 1.10 1.75 0.94
Other relatives 57.32 15.12 13.23 4.25 1.73 8.35 1.67 1.01
Best friend 58.27 20.79 15.91 2.99 0.94 1.10 1.66 0.92
Teachers in high school 66.30 15.59 13.07 2.83 1.10 1.10 1.55 0.90
Teachers in elementary 
school 73.39 14.96 9.61 0.94 0.00 1.10 1.37 0.70










































































(non)existence of parents' political homogamy in IO. Furthermore, it was revealed 
that the quality of the relationship with the mother is not, but with the father is, in 
a statistically significant relationship with the assessment of the influence of both 
parents as agents of socialization, which only partially confirms the third hypothe-
sis. The mother has a greater (M = 2.56) and the father a lesser influence (M = 1.97) 
in families where the relationship with the father was assessed as ambivalent. If the 
participants assessed the relationship with the mother as such, the assessed father's 
influence in PS did not differ from the mother's influence. The father had a greater 
influence (M = 2.40) in families where the relationships were extremely good than 
in those where they were ambivalent (M = 2.07) (F(625) = 4.485*).
ANOVA determined differences in the assessment of the influence of agents 
with respect to the sociodemographic characteristics of the participants' families. The 
mother's influence in PS is assessed to be somewhat more important (or, more pre-
cisely, less unimportant) in families with the highest (M = 2.35) level of family educa-
tion than in families with the lowest (M = 2.03) level of cultural capital (F623 = 4.858*). 
In patriarchal families (in which decisions are always or more often made by the 
father), the father's influence was assessed to be higher (M = 2.62) than in egalitarian 
(M = 2.31) and matriarchal families (M = 1.94). The analysis did not determine the 
significance of differences when it comes to the variables of settlement size and sex.
When asked directly who has decisively influenced their political views, almost 
half of the participants (44.8%) did not provide an answer. Among those who did, 
the most common answer was parents (16,6%), followed by me, alone (15.3%), all 
others (13,9 %), and no one (9.5%). Thus, almost half of the participants who answe-
red this question believe that the agents of socialization did not have any influence 
on the formation of their political attitudes.  Consistent with the third hypothesis, 
the post-hoc test found that there are differences in the experience of the frequency 
of family discussions about politics with respect to determining the importance of 
individual agents (F(350)= 6.237**). Participants who acknowledge the crucial impor-
tance of parents (M = 3.15) are more likely to have family discussions about politics 
than those who acknowledge the crucial importance of other PS agents (M = 2.73) 
and those who felt that no one has influenced their attitudes (M = 2.63).
Participants' ideological self-identification (PIS) and the 
perceived parents' ideological orientation (PIO)
The left-center-right ideological orientation scale, a standard measuring instrument 
in which the participants locate their place on the scale (Rico and Jennings, 2016), 
Table 3. Influence of mother and father on the participants' political attitudes (in %)
FATHER'S INFLUENCE
Not at all A little Somewhat A lot
MOTHER'S  
INFLUENCE
Not at all 80.1 8.7 6.9 4.3
A little 8.5 68.3 12.2 11.0
Somewhat 4.8 3.4 73.5 18.4
A lot 10.6 7.1 10.6 71.8

























was used as an indicator of the participants' and their parents' political attitudes. 
Fuchs and Klingemann (1990: 204) point out that self-classification on a scale is a 
choice of label, a reduction of a complex reality to a simple concept associated with 
party preferences, party identification, political values, and the political behavior of 
individuals. Zuell and Scholz (2016) problematize the content validity of this scale 
and argue that the terms left and right evoke different associations in different co-
untries.24 Other authors (Čular, 1999) believe that the scale has proven its validity 
and reliability in recent decades, but that it should be borne in mind that it is not a 
consistent set of values or a consistent ideological image of the world.
Based on the small share of those who did not answer these questions, it can be 
concluded that the students feel familiar with the meaning of the terms left-center-
right, which is not all that surprising given their constant presence in the Croatian 
media landscape.25
The distributions of the responses (Figure 2.) have the same unimodal curve 
shape with a more pronounced left side as in the parents. The largest part, almost 
half of the sample, placed themselves in the political center, and there were twice as 
many students in the three positions on the left (32.5%) than in the three positions 
on the right (16.7%).26
Regional differences are statistically significant but weakly related to differenc-
es in PIS (χ2 = 18.134*; df = 6; Cramer's V = .126). The majority of participants 
in the three regional categories were located in the center, with the exception of 
the students from Dalmatian counties, who were slightly more located on the ri-
24 The authors also problematize the central point of the scale (0 = center) because they believe 
that positioning in the middle of the ideological range, in addition to choosing the option of a 
political center, can mean (1) concealing the answer I do not know and (2) the option I can not 
decide.
25 Not providing an answer to this question is related to the variable interest in politics (χ2 = 
72.468**; df = 9; Cramer's V = .195) because two-thirds of those who did not answer this que-
stion are not interested in politics at all, and an additional fifth is indecisive.
26 The percentage of participants located in the center coincides with the distribution of IO 
determined at the national level (Sekulić, 2016; Ježovita, 2019). The higher share of partici-
pants located on the left than on the right in relation to the national level is a consequence 
of the higher representation of participants from the regions of Primorje and Istria in our 
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ght than in the center (35.8%: 34.0%). The closest to the left are students from the 
Primorje-Gorski Kotar and Istria counties, of whom a slightly smaller percentage 
are located on the left (38.8%) than in the center (44.9%). The experience of war 
destruction also affects the difference in PIS (t = –3.362**). Students who grew up in 
war-stricken counties on average were placed in the center (M = 4.10), while others 
were placed in the center but leaning to the left (M = 3.62).27
A statistically significant correlation was found between the interest in politics 
and IS. The chi-square test (χ2 = 41.397**; df = 4; Cramer's V = .188) reveals that tho-
se participants who ranked themselves in the center admit the most that they are not 
interested in politics (62.6%) and the least that they are interested (14.8%). Signifi-
cantly greater interest in politics is expressed by the "leftists" (37.9%) and "rightists" 
(34.6%). It should be further explored whether positioning in the center for the part 
of participants who are not interested in politics at all conceals the answer I do not 
know (Zuell and Scholz, 2016), or whether this is a matter of political conformism, 
a superficial answer whose meaning is to classify/shelter in the unproblematic lee of 
the social matrix?
Of the sociodemographic variables, statistically significant differences28 in 
 self-identification were found with respect to the mother's education and the family 
cultural capital (Table 4). On average, participants whose mothers have a college and 
university education tend to gravitate toward the left, while those whose mothers 
have a high school education are on average placed in the center. We find the same 
pattern concerning the variable Family cultural capital. On average, children of par-
ents with secondary education are closer to the center, while those with college and 
university education are closer to the left.
In line with expectations emerging from the fourth hypothesis,  there are very 
small differences in the assessment of their own and their parents' IO, and the sta-
27 Elchardus and Spruyt (2009) present an intriguing idea of the differences in students' IO with 
respect to the scientific fields of study. This study did not identify statistically significant diffe-
rences in IS between the students in the social, natural, and technical fields.
28 Statistically, we find the strongest link of IS with the variables of religiosity because, with the 
increase in religiosity, the classification on the left decreases, and the one in the center and 
on the right increases. However, the analysis of this connection goes beyond the topic of this 
paper.
Table 4.  Testing for IS differences with respect to sociodemographic variables 








2. Four-year high school 282 3.88 1.468
3. College 85 3.38 1.345
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tistical analysis reveals significant connections of one's own and the father's IO (χ2 
= 468.048**; df = 4; Cramer's V = .639) and the mother's IO (χ2 = 490.095**; df = 
4; Cramer's V = .628). The participants also perceive a very high ideological homo-
gamy (matching IOs) of their parents (χ2 = 658.594**; df = 4; Cramer's V = .755), 
with slightly more fathers gravitating toward the right and less toward the left than 
mothers. The range of matching IOs on the seven-point scale for each category is 
more than half and ranges from 51.4% to as much as 87.9%, and the highest match 
is found in the center and in the two extreme categories.
The relationship between PIS and the variable Concordance of the parents' ideo-
logical orientation (Table 5) can be viewed as an indirect indicator of the success of 
FIO transmission. It can be seen that more than two-thirds of the participants have 
placed themselves on the (abbreviated) IO scale, on the same side on which they 
placed their parents.
Previous research (Ilišin et al., 2013) found that more than two-thirds of young 
people (70.3%) believe that their political views to some extent (slightly, partially, or 
completely) agree with their parents' views. In this study, an almost identical per-
centage (70.5%) of participants placed themselves and both parents on the same side 
of the IO scale, which additionally supports the fourth hypothesis.
The chi-square test reveals (χ2 = 9.866*; df = 2; Cramer's V = .130) that the di-
fference between one's own and the parents' IO is recognized more (39.4%) by the 
participants interested in politics than those who are indifferent (25.6%) and those 
disinterested in politics (26.1%). From the above, it can be concluded that greater 
interest in politics is associated with questioning the parents' political views and that 
a lower interest means a greater likelihood of adopting the parents' IO. According 
to the fifth hypothesis, the parents' authority in IO transmission (χ2 = 10.095*; df = 
2; Cramer's V = .132) is less questioned by those who rate the relationship with the 
parents as extremely good (24.5%) than those who define it as good (34.8 %) and 
those who rate it as ambivalent (38.0%).
The distribution of results on the created variable Concordance of FIO shows 
that slightly less than a third of the participants place their parents and themselves 
in the political center (29.0%), a quarter on the left (23.5%), and one-eighth on the 
right (12.3%), while slightly more than a quarter of the participants (27.1%) consid-
er having a different IO from their family. In the last category, there is an equal share 
of those who identify their IO with the mother's and those who identify it with the 
father's IO. Let us add that the pattern of gender socialization, according to which 
the son's IO would be more similar to the father's and the daughter's IO to the moth-
er's, has not been confirmed.
Table 5. Concordance between PIS and PIO (in %)
BOTH PARENTS' IO
Left Center Right Different
PARTICIPANTS' IO
Left 72.3 7.8 4.4 15.5
Center 8.9 68.1 8.9 14.1
Right 2.8 6.5 73.8 16.8










































































By analyzing the distribution within certain categories, we find that equally high 
(almost three-quarters) concordance between their own and their parents' IO is per-
ceived by those participants who are located on the right and left, and a slightly less 
concordance, but still more than two-thirds, by those who are located in the center 
(Table 5). The participants who do not perceive a concordance of FIO to a very 
small extent believe that family members have diametrically opposed IOs. When we 
swap PIS and PIO positions in the analysis, we obtain data on the extent to which 
the participants have accepted (perceived) PIO. The highest concordance has been 
found in the center (88.9%), slightly less on the left (84.7%), and even less on the 
right (70.5%). The twice as many participants who were socialized in families in 
which they perceive the PIO as right-wing "abandoned" their parents' perceived IO 
than those who perceive the family political climate as being left-oriented.29 More 
frequent abandonment of the right PIO may be hypothetically explained with the 
thesis on the liberalizing effect of education (Hello et al., 2004). Research indicates 
that right-wing citizent of Croatia are more inclined towards conservative values, 
nationalism, gender conservativism, and a more negative attitude towards homo-
sexuals (Sekulić, 2016), and that University of Rijeka students share more liberal 
worldviews from the student average (Ilišin, 2014).
Concordant FIO are statistically significantly related to the participants' interest 
in politics and the stimulating family political environment, which is in line with 
fifth hypothesis  (Table 6). Families whose members are placed in the center of the 
IO scale differ from the others because their everyday environment is less tempered 
by politics, and political topics are less often the subject of discussion than in the 
remaining families. The observed difference should be further investigated because 
it is indicative that more than half of the participants (55.8%) who never discuss 
political topics in their families are located in the center. As the frequency of family 
political debates increases, the participants' self-classification in the center decreas-
es, and it increases at the poles of the scale. The argument in favor of the claim that 
families belonging to the most widespread political orientation – ideological center 
are less politically stimulating is the fact that the participants from these families are 
less interested in politics than the participants from the families of the remaining 
IOs (χ2 = 47.315**; df = 6; Cramer's V = .201).
Participants who grew up in counties directly affected by war differ from those 
who did not have that experience in terms of the extent of concordance between 
FIO identity and the share of individual categories on the scale (χ2 = 23.648**; df = 
3; Cramer's V= .204). Participants from war-stricken counties classify their FIO as 
being more on the right (21.5%) than on the left (12.3%), in contrast to counties 
unaffected by war (11.2%: 29.3%). The shift of the curve to the right on the scale 
of ideological orientation in the counties affected by war fits in with the findings 
of previous research on differences in ideological orientations in Croatian regions 
(Boneta, 2004). Interestingly, there is a difference (χ2 = 5.510*; df = 1; C = .098) in 
the FIO concordance, which is smaller in the war-affected counties than in the re-
maining counties. Additional statistical analysis reveals that the participants from 
29 The thesis of Boehnke et al. (2007) that parental influence in PS is stronger in families whose 
political preferences deviate from the spirit of the time in a particular society has not been 
confirmed. In the Croatian case, it is reasonable to assume that we find a departure from the 
political spirit of the time in families that are outside the political center according to their 
IO. There are no statistically significant differences regarding IS and perceived POI between 

























war-stricken counties, in 301relation to their parents, have moved significantly towards 
the center and the left, and very little towards the right.32 It seems plausible to assu-
me that this shift can, at least in part, be explained as a consequence of the liberali-
zing effect of education (Hello et al., 2004).
Our research also confirmed previous research findings (Ilišin, 2014) that stu-
dents from the Istria and Primorje-Gorski Kotar County are more inclined to the 
left political option than students from other parts of Croatia. However, it should be 
added that University of Rijeka students from other parts of Croatia, with the excep-
tion of those from Dalmatian counties, are placed more on the left than on the right 
side of the scale. The analyses did not identify statistically significant differences in 
the matching of PIS and PIO with respect to the participants' sex, settlement  size, 
and key family decision-making dynamics.
Assessed agent impact and concordance of PIS and PIO
A connection was found between assessment of the agent's impact on political atti-
tudes and the participants' position on the IO scale. Those participants who aligned 
themselves on the left and on the right admit a somewhat stronger, albeit still small, 
influence of their parents and friends than those who ranked themselves in the cen-
ter (Table 7). In the most numerous category, the participants who have settled in 
the political center, less than others, acknowledge the influence of all agents on the 
30 How interested are you in politics? Answer categories: 1 = not interested at all; 2 = mostly not 
interested; 3 = neither interested nor uninterested; 4 = mostly interested; 5 = extremely intere-
sted.
31 How often do you discuss politics in your family? Answer categories: 1 = never; 2 = very rarely; 
3 = occasionally; 4 = often; 5 = constantly.
32 The chi square (χ2 = 100.604**; df = 6; Cramer's V = .622) reveals that a quarter of chil-
dren (23.8%) from right-wing families moved to the center and a tenth (9.5%) to the left. Half 
(48.1%) of children from ideologically inhomogeneous families were located in the center, a 
third on the left (37.0%), and only one in seven on the right (14.8). The majority (92.5%) of 
children from center-leaning family remained in the center, and a quarter (23.8%) of children 
from the "left" settled in the center, and all the rest "remained" on the left.
Table 6. Testing for differences in the concordance of the FIO with regards to the 
interest in politics and the frequency of family discussions about politics
Interest in politics30 N M SD df F Post-hoc
FAMILY IO 
(Tamhane)
1. Left 149 2.87 1.172
3 18.193** 2<1, 3, 4
2. Center 184 2.05 .993
3. Right 78 2.76 1.186
4, Different 172 2.78 1.300
Frequency of political discussions31
FAMILY IO 
(Tamhane)
1. Left 149 2.99 .788
3 12.530** 2<1, 3, 4
2. Center 184 2.49 .887
3. Right 78 3.00 .721










































































formation of their political views.33 The only deviation from this pattern is found 
in the influence of the extended family, whose influence is acknowledged by more 
participants leaning to the right than those in the center and on the left. The hypo-
thetical cause of this deviation could be found in the difference in attitudes about 
family and marriage between the left and the right. Sekulić (2016) finds that those 
oriented to the right are more inclined to conservative attitudes, which highly value 
the patriarchal family, and thus kinship authority.34
Of the socioeconomic variables, a statistically significant relationship was found 
between gender and the assessment of the crucial agent (χ2 = 11.722*; df = 3; Cram-
er's V = .184). Male students more often deny the role of all analyzed agents (55.9%) 
than female students (38.2%). At the same time, female students acknowledge the 
greater importance of the family (35.0%) in shaping their political attitudes than 
male students (21.3%).  The causes of these sex differences, which should certainly 
be further investigated, are probably found in the characteristics of dominant fem-
ininity and masculinity manifestly present in gender socialization in Croatian soci-
ety. Traditional gender discourse ascribes to the man the engagement in the public 
sphere, while it places the woman in the private, family sphere. Despite visible mod-
ernization changes in value attitudes about gender equality (Sekulić, 2012), research 
reveals that changes in the direction of egalitarianism occur more on a declarative 
than practical level (Galić, Buzov, and Bandalović, 2009).
33 For example, the chi-square reveals that twice as many participants from the center (47.2%) 
as those from the left (24.8%) and the right (21.5%) claim that their fathers did not influence 
their political views at all.
34 Answer categories: 1 = none; 2 = a little; 3 = somewhat; 4 = a lot; 5 = extremely much
Table 7. ANOVA – differences in the assessment of the impact on political 
attitudes with respect to PIS
N M34 SD df F Post-hoc
MOTHER 
(Tamhane)
1. Left 206 2.38 1.162
2 21.578** 2<1, 3,2. Center 269 1.85 .977
3. Right 107 2.52 1.144
FATHER   
(Scheffe)
1. Left 206 2.49 1.151
2 25.755** 2<1, 32. Center 267 1.96 1.068




1. Left 187 1.67 .982
2 7.435* 1, 2<32. Center 253 1.56 .918
3. Right 98 2.02 1.227
BEST FRIEND 
(Tamhane)
1. Left 206 1.79 .968
2 5.577* 2<1, 32. Center 268 1.55 .849
3. Right 107 1.82 .969
PEER GROUP 
(Scheffe)
1. Left 206 1.91 1.046
2 6.830* 2<1, 32. Center 269 1.62 .858

























Contrary to the third hypothesis, the assessment of the quality of relationships 
with parents did not prove to be statistically significant with regards to the response 
about the parents' decisive influence on political attitudes. Neither did those par-
ticipants who assessed their relationship with the parents as ambivalent perceive 
the parents as less crucial agents, nor did those who assessed this relationship as 
extremely good diminish their own influence on the formation of these attitudes.
The existence of an association was established between the assessment of the 
FIO and the assessment of the decisive influence on the formation of political atti-
tudes (Table 8). Slightly less than half of the participants who classified themselves 
and their parents on the left or on the right believe that the family had a decisive 
influence on their attitudes. In contrast, most participants from "centrist families" 
and those without IO concordance claimed to have been autonomous in shaping 
their political position. Participants from families in which there is no harmony in 
IO in the PS period did not have harmonious ideological orientations, so they had 
to define their ideological position more independently. In contrast, the response of 
participants from harmonious "centrist" families is unexpected and its background 
should be further explored. Hypothetically, it is possible that this is an attempt to 
reconcile two opposing tendencies encountered by young people in late modernity. 
On the one hand, the imperative of active management of one's own life (Beck and 
Beck-Gersheim, 2002), which includes the aspiration for uniqueness and indepen-
dence, and, on the other hand, the self-classification into a more represented posi-
tion of the political center (mainstream). In order to give at least the appearance of 
autonomy in self-reflection, external influences are denied and self-sufficiency is 
emphasized in creating the property of a political biography.
Conclusion
For a long time, the PS analysis was based on assumptions about (1) child/youth 
passivity and (2) children's knowledge about their parents' political views. The oc-
currence of a generational mismatch was interpreted either (1) as a result of a failed 
transmission and/or (2) a consequence of a change in the social context. Newer 
approaches to PS emphasize a more active role of children/youth in shaping their 
own worldview. The results of this research support this thesis by finding a broad be-
lief in students that they have autonomously devised their political views. Students 
deny the influence of external PS agents and only acknowledge a very weak influen-
ce of their parents, both mother and father. The influence of an individual parent is 
related to sociodemographic characteristics and family relationships. The mother's 
influence grows with her education level, while the father's influence is greater in 
families with a patriarchal distribution of power. The father's role is greater when 
Table 8. FIO and the assessment of the decisive influence on political attitudes (in %)
Family Me No one Someone else
Left 43.6 15.4 14.1 26.9
Center 22.0 34.0 22.0 22.0
Right 43.8 20.8 12.5 22.9
Different 23.8 35.2 13.3 27.6










































































the participants rate the relationship with him as good, and the mother's influence 
grows when the relationship with the father is assessed as poor. The participants 
who grew up in a politically stimulating home environment in which politics was 
more frequently discussed acknowledge the somewhat greater influence of parents 
on their political attitudes. In contrast to this and findings from previous research 
(Boehnke et al., 2007; Hooghe and Boonen, 2015), parents' political homogamy has 
not been shown to influence the assessment of parents' influence.
The assessment of weak parental influence on political attitudes is inconsistent 
with the high level of parental and intergenerational IO concordance. First of all, 
eight out of ten participants place both parents in the same position on the three-cat-
egory (left-center-right) IO scale, suggesting that the primary PS process was not 
marked by conflicting information. Furthermore, seven out of ten participants place 
themselves and both parents in the same position on the IO scale, suggesting a suc-
cessful family transmission of political views. Nevertheless, a significant part of the 
participants believes that their political views are the result of independent choice, 
from which it can be concluded that the idea of do-it-yourself political biographies 
is present among the participants. Most participants believe that the analzyed infor-
mal and formal PS agents did not strongly influence the formation of their political 
views. Despite underestimating and even denying the importance of family PS, a 
great similarity between the participants' and their parents' IO supports the theory 
of social learning. However, the above mentioned can only be valid in the informal 
PS context, as the influence of primary and high school teachers (formal PS agents) 
was assessed as negligible.
The denial of the importance of informal and formal PS agents indicates an 
extended late modernity individualistic paradigm among the surveyed students. 
Emphasizing one's own role in the PS process fits into the theory of lifelong open-
ness, but a small deviation from the parents' IO does not support the justification of 
such a conclusion. Although this contradiction needs to be further investigated, it 
seems justified to consider the applicability of the hypothesis about the relationship 
between the social environment and the PS for its explanation. Namely, according 
to this hypothesis, it is possible to assume that the process of the re-traditionaliza-
tion of Croatian society contributes to the high concordance of the participants' and 
their parents' IOs and that the opposite process of individualization contributes to 
the participants' simultaneous denial of the influence of external agents on their PS.
Interestingly, most participants placed themselves and their parents in the cen-
ter of the IO scale. In the case of conflicting parental IOs (one on the left and the 
other on the right), most participants do not align with one of the parents but place 
themselves in the center of the scale.
In contrast, participants from families in which political topics are more often 
the subject of discussion and those who show a greater interest in politics are more 
often placed outside the political center on the IO scale. Interestingly, students in-
terested in politics are at the forefront of assessing that their IO differs from their 
parents' IOs. Thus, socialized participants in a politically stimulating environment 
are more likely to move away from the political center and from their parents' IOs. 
It is also noticeable that the participants who observe the difference between their 
own and their parents' IOs placed themselves higher to the left on the scale than 
their parents. Therefore, it sounds paradoxical that the autonomously constructed 
political attitudes are more often than the average advocated by the participants who 

























in building political attitudes, which is intriguing, especially in the most numerous 
category of the political center, should be further investigated. Hypothetically, this 
may be an attempt to rehabilitate credibility in one's own eyes because of an aware-
ness of the discrepancy between the accepted late modernity idea of a "do it yourself 
biography" that implies the authenticity of the individual and belonging to the most 
widespread political orientation category.
Finally, the limitations of this paper should be emphasized, which, in data 
collection, relied on two methods that can detect weak points. The first method 
is the participants' assessment of their parents' IO, in which there is a possibility 
of misjudgment, regardless of whether they want to identify with the parents or 
want to distance themselves from them. Nevertheless, we believe that, in the con-
text of ideological divisions and conflicts in Croatian society, this assessment has 
value because it implicitly indicates the participants' perception of IO transmission. 
Another problem is the application of the retrospective method in the participants' 
assessment of the influence of different agents on their own political attitudes. Jas-
pers, Lubbers, and De Graaf (2009) believe that data obtained with the retrospective 
method should be used with great caution because people tend to adapt memory to 
their current attitudes and align them with social changes that have occurred in the 
meantime. Finally, it should be pointed out that our sample is dominated by partic-
ipants from Istria and Primorje-Gorski Kotar counties; therefore, the results cannot 
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Pada li jabuka daleko od stabla? Agensi socijalizacije 
ideologijske orijentacije studenata
Sažetak u radu su predstavljeni rezultati terenskog istraživanja procjene utjecaja 
neformalnih i formalnih agensa procesa političke socijalizacije na uzorku studenata 
Sveučilišta u rijeci (n=635). Analizirana je povezanost ideologijske samoidentifika-
cije ispitanika i procijenjene ideologijske orijentacije roditelja. Studenti smatraju 
da nijedan agens socijalizacije nije čak ni osrednje utjecao na oblikovanje njihovih 
političkih stavova, a najslabijim ocjenjuju utjecaj agensa formalne političke socija-
lizacije – nastavnika u osnovnoj i srednjoj školi. Ispitanici smatraju da su roditelji 
više od ostalih agensa utjecali na njihove političke stavove, ali taj utjecaj u prosjeku 
ocjenjuju slabim, neovisno o tome smještaju li roditelje na istu ili različite pozicije 
na skali ideologijske orijentacije. Ispitanici koji su se svrstali na ljevicu i na desnicu 
priznaju nešto snažniji utjecaj roditeljske neformalne političke socijalizacije od onih 
koji su se svrstali u centar. utvrđene su statistički značajne veze između ideologijske 
samoidentifikacije ispitanika i procijenjene ideologijske orijentacije roditelja. Mali 
je udio ispitanika koji ne percipiraju postojanje vlastitog i roditeljskog suglasja u 
ideologijskoj orijentaciji, a zanemariv je udio onih koji svoje roditelje smještaju na 
dijametralne pozicije skale. Ispitanici koji imaju veći interes za politiku, ali i oni iz po-
litički stimulativnijeg okruženja, skloniji su odmaknuti se od političkog centra, kao 
i od ideologijske orijentacije svojih roditelja. Obiteljsko podudaranje ideologijske 
orijentacije raste percepcijom kvalitetnijih odnosa s roditeljima.
Ključne riječi politička socijalizacija, agensi socijalizacije, ideologijske orijentacije, 
studenti
